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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 920484-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal concerning the conviction of the Defendant 
for violation of the Utah Criminal Code 76-6-505, issuing a bad 
check. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1992) . The Defendant appeals the judgment 
of dismissal under Utah Code Ann. 77-18a-l(2)(e)(Supp. 1991) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues on appeal are based upon interpretation of, and 
application of the law to the Defendants actions in dealing with 
Nephi Lumber Company. The Utah Criminal Code 76-6-505 states: 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a 
check or draft for the payment of money, for 
the purpose of obtaining form any person, 
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money 
property, or other thing of value or paying 
for any services, wages, salary, labor, or 
rent, knowing it will not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, 
is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft. 
The issues presenting on appeal are: 
1. Does a check issued to pay a past due debt upon an open 
account over two months after the goods were delivered come within 
the proscriptions of the statute. 
2. Does concrete come within the statutory definitions of 
services, or is concrete merely a product. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with Issuing a bad check or draft in a 
sum exceeding $2,000.00,- a second degree felony, under Utah 
Criminal Code 76-6-505 (3)(d). Defendant was tried by a jury and 
was convicted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant, William Christensen, who engaged in the 
construction business, had undertaken a contract to build a cabin 
Ln the area of Fairveiw, Utah. As a part of this project he had 
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contacted three concrete supply companies, Cox Rock Products, 
Geneva Slag Co., and Nephi Lumber Company and received quotes for 
the delivered price of concrete. Nephi Lumber gave the low quote 
and was willing to deliver to the site for the price quoted. 
In June, 1991 the Defendant advised Nephi Lumber, through 
their owner-manager, Steve Ludlow, that he wanted to buy concrete 
from them for his Fairview job, and wished to purchase on 
credit.(T-10) He supplied credit references. Thereafter Steve 
Ludlow advised the defendant that they would not extend credit, and 
sales would have to be on a C.O.D. basis. The Defendant promised 
payment on delivery, and ordered concrete.(T-ll) 
The first loads of concrete were delivered to the cite on July 
5, 1991, but the Defendant did not pay for the concrete delivered 
at that time. (T-12) However, he did order more loads. Defendant 
attempted to cancel this later order, however one truckload was 
already on its way and made the delivery. This load was not paid 
for. At each delivery the Defendant signed a delivery receipt, 
which contained provisions consistent with the extension of credit, 
i.e. interest to be charged on the open account.(T-13, 18) 
The defendant had intended on paying for the concrete from the 
proceeds he received form the cabin owner. However, the owner 
failed to pay the Defendant and consequently he was unable to pay 
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Nephi Lumber Company. (T-40,41) 
Nephi Lumber Company made telephone calls to the defendant in 
an attempt to collect the debt. In September the defendant issued 
the check in question, payable to Nephi Lumber Company in the sum 
in excess of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00).(T-42) The check was 
drawn upon an account in the credit Union which was in the name of 
the Defendant and his father. (T-52) 
Defendant's father testified that the Defendant was living 
with him at all times pertinent herein. The Defendant's father also 
testified that they discussed Defendants business on frequent 
occasions and the Defendant has always been honest in his 
communications with his father. (T-50) The Defendant had explained 
to his father the difficulties he was having on the cabin project, 
including the outstanding bill to Nephi Lumber Company. (T-50) 
Defendant also discussed with his father his mining business 
activities, and advised his father that he had been able to secure 
an investor in a certain mining venture. (T-53) That this investor 
was going to make a very sizable cash transfer to their Credit 
Union Account, which would be used to finance the mining venture, 
and which could also be used to pay some of the defendants 
outstanding bills, including the bill to Nephi Lumber Company. And 
based upon such understanding the defendant prepared and mailed to 
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Nephi Lumber Company the check which is the basis of this 
action.(T-43) 
The investor did not make the cash transfer, and the check to 
Nephi Lumber Company was dishonored. The defendant was unable to 
recover from his reliance upon the investors promise of financing, 
and was then unable to cover checks issued in reliance on the 
proposed investment. (T-43) The Defendant explains that he had no 
intent to defraud Nephi Lumber Company, and that the check was not 
issued as an inducement for Nephi Lumber Company to part with its 
goods, but was for payment of a past due credit account. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant's actions did not fall with in the proscriptions 
of the statute under which the Defendant was charged for several 
reasons. 
First, the Defendant had no intent to defraud Nephi Lumber 
Company, and the check was not issued as a inducement for Nephi 
Lumber Company to part with its goods but was used for payment of 
a past due credit account. 
Second, concrete is not a service, but should be found to be 
a product under the statute. Therefore, the check could not be 
found to be issued for services, rent, wages, etc as proscribed 
under the statute. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CONCRETE CANNOT BE FOUND TO BE A SERVICE UNDER THE STATUTE 
In Blacks Law Dictionary Fourth Edition, it states in part 
that the term Service "has a variety of meanings depending upon the 
context or sense in which used." Blacks Law Dictionary goes on to 
state that service is: 
The being employed to serve another; duty or 
labor rendered by one person to another, the 
former being bound to submit his will to the 
direction and control of the latter. The act 
of serving; the labor performed or duties 
required. Performance of labor for benefit of 
another, or at another command; attendance of 
an inferior, hired helper, slave, etc. 
There has been little attempt to define services under the 
court system. Therefore the words within the code should be given 
their accepted meanings. This point is emphasized in In re 
Canadian Pacific Ltd. 754 F.2d 992 (1985). "In the absence of 
persuasive reasons to the contrary, words in a statute are to be 
given their ordinary and common meaning." 
In the present case concerning Mr. Christensen the trial court 
found that concrete contains services such as delivery and wage^ 
since workmen have to be employed to make the concrete, and thus 
the writing of a check for a past due concrete account would be 
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prohibited by Utah Criminal Code 76-6-505. However the Defendant 
contends that concrete is not a Service but that concrete is a 
product. 
Webster's New World Dictionary, Third College Edition, 1988, 
defines product: "something produced by nature or made be human 
industry." The defense states that concrete is a product for 
several reasons. First, the Defendant bought the concrete by the 
yard. For example the concrete was bought like carpet or lumber, 
both are considered to be a product and both are bought by a 
measured amount. Second, the Defendant was not billed to pay Nephi 
Lumber to finish the cement or to set the forms in preparation for 
the cement. The Defendant was only billed for the cement. He was 
not billed for any type of service, due to the fact that no labor 
was preformed, i.e. finishing the cement or preparation for the 
cement. This fact makes it extremely clear that no service was 
done for the Defendant. Due to the definitions and facts stated 
above, providing concrete is not providing a service, hence the 
statute does not apply to the Defendant's action. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT ISSUE THE CHECK WITH THE INTENT TO 
DEFRAUD NEPHI LUMBER COMPANY 
In the statute it specifically states that the party issuing 
7 
the check must do so for the purpose of obtaining .... any . . . 
property. And thus to commit the crime the issuing of the check 
must be the inducement for the injured party to part with their 
goods, or fraudulent intent. 
In Colin v. State 168 S.W.2d 500, the court specifically 
states that there must be a fraudulent intent. If there is no 
fraudulent intent. The Defendant cannot be found guilty of 
violating the statute. 
The Defendant did not issue the check with the intent to 
defraud Nephi Lumber Company. The Defendant had reason to believe 
that there would be funds to cover the check written, this belief 
constitutes a defense under the courts ruling in a similar case, 
People v. Griffith 262 P.2d 355; 
In negotiating a check, the maker does not 
necessarily represent that he then has in the 
bank funds out of which it will be paid; but 
he only represents, by the act of passing the 
check, that it is a good and valid order for 
its amount and that the existing state of 
facts is such that in the ordinary course of 
business it will be paid on presentation. One 
who negotiates a check with knowledge he has 
not sufficient funds in the band to meet it, 
but who has good reason to believe, and 
honestly does believe, that it will be paid,-
cannot be said to have an intent to defraud 
the payee of the check Reasonable 
expectation of payment constitutes a defense 
to the charge. 
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There must also be a concurrence in time where there was an 
exchange of "something of value" for the bad check. 
In a similar case State v. McLean 44 So2d 608, the defendant 
was delivered bananas and promised to pay, however when the 
defendant in this particular case paid for the bananas, the check 
used for payment was not honored. The court then found; 
This language indicates that the crime 
denounced is committed only when there is a 
concurrence in point of time of an intent to 
defraud, the receipt of title and possession 
of a thing of value, and the giving of the 
worthless check in payment therefore; If 
the check is given subsequent to the receipt 
of the thing the required exchange does not 
take place, and no intent to defraud attends 
the check's issuance. Rather, in such a case, 
the check is issued in payment of an 
antecedent debt - a debt created by a previous 
sale and delivery of the thing on terms of 
credit, on a promise to pay , not on the faith 
of a check. And on the issuance of the check 
the vendor is not by the check defrauded; the 
fraud, if any, occurred when credit was 
extended. 
From this factual situation it is clear that 
the worthless check was not given in exchange 
for the bananas with the intent to defraud. 
The bananas had been entrusted and delivered 
to the defendant three days earlier, obviously 
on the strength of his promise to pay when all 
weights were ascertained. 
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POINT III 
THE CHECK ISSUED DID NOT FAIL WITHIN THE PROSCRIPTIONS 
OF THE STATUTE, BECAUSE IT WAS MADE TO PAY A PREEXISTING DEBT. 
It is an uncontested fact that Mr. Christensen gave the check 
in question to Nephi Lumber Company to discharge a pre-existing 
debt. In a similar case, Broadus v. State 38 So.2d 692, the 
Defendant, Broadus, obtained machinery, and at a later time paid 
for the machinery within that day. However the payment and the 
machinery where not simultaneously exchanged. The Court in the 
Broadus case found that the defendant obtained nothing with the 
check. 
In the present case the Defendant did not obtain anything for 
the check. When Nephi Lumber Company let the cement leave their 
possession and control without demanding and receiving the purchase 
price, they extended credit for the cement. 
Christensen did not receive cement for delivering his check, 
for he had already, before that time obtained the cement. In 
essence he received nothing for his check. The Court in Moore v. 
State 38 So.2d 693, (Miss. 1949) restates this position again. 
The delivery of the product (cement) was done before the check was 
ever mentioned, therefore the Defendant was simply extended credit 
and did not obtain the cement on the basis of a check. 
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In State v. Green 972 P.2d 400 (Utah 1983), the defendant, 
Green, wrote a check in the amount of $10,000.00 for the purpose of 
opening a savings account. The check when presented to the bank it 
was drawn on, and was found to be a bad check. 
The Court in the Green case found that there was nothing 
exchanged for the check and therefore an essential element of the 
crime was missing. 
This argument can be applied to the present case. The check 
was written on a past due debt, so nothing of value was exchanged 
on the faith of the check. The Defendant did not violate the 
statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should reverse 
the trial court's decision concerning the interpretation of the 
statute, ruling that concrete is not a service specified, and 
further that the bad check was not issued for the purpose of 
obtaining the concrete that had been previously delivered, and 
consequently the charge against the defendant should be dismissal. 
Dated t h i e ^ f ^ day of March, 1993. 
MILTON T.'HARMON 
Attorney for the Appellant / 
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